Layered PNT architectures raise the burden of proving resilience

Keysight’s report identifies a shift from protecting individual GNSS receivers toward layered, multi-source PNT architectures. It argues that this complexity is pushing assurance earlier in development and broadening testing to include combined threats and system-level behavior.

Transportation, energy and communications systems depend on reliable position or time. Adding sources does not remove the need to verify how the complete system detects unreliable inputs and responds under degraded conditions.

Keysight’s PNT Report 2026 describes positioning, navigation and timing architectures becoming more layered rather than replacing GNSS outright. LEO services, terrestrial backups, inertial sensors and other inputs are being developed or combined to improve resilience and support autonomous systems. That expands the assurance problem: developers must assess not just individual receivers, but how complete systems respond to unreliable or conflicting information. The report highlights combined threats, including jamming followed by spoofing and coordinated radio-frequency and cyber effects. It also identifies pressure to move testing earlier into model- and software-based development and reproduce more complex operating conditions in simulation. For infrastructure and autonomous-system operators, the relevant question is whether a system detects degraded positioning or timing and behaves appropriately afterward. These are vendor-reported industry trends, not independent evidence that particular architectures have achieved the claimed resilience.

Evidence supplied by Inside GNSS.